Tragedy of the Commons
Tragedy of the Commons — Resource Depletion
The tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals, each acting in their own rational interest, collectively deplete a shared resource — a fishery, aquifer, or pasture — to the detriment of everyone. This simulation models a shared fishery where each agent decides how many units to harvest given others' behavior, showing convergence to overuse without coordination. Solutions including quotas, privatization, and Coasian bargaining can each be applied and compared.
What you can do in this simulation
- Set the number of agents sharing the resource and their individual harvest decisions
- Observe resource stock declining over time as individual incentives dominate collective welfare
- Apply a harvest quota and compare sustainable yield against the unregulated outcome
- Privatize the resource by assigning property rights and observe internalization of externalities
- Enable agent communication and see how Coasian bargaining can restore the efficient outcome
Concepts covered
common-pool resource · overuse · harvest quota · property rights · externality · collective action
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